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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This appeal is brought pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
S 78-2-2(3)(j). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from an order granting Valley Mort-
gage Company (hereinafter "Valley Mortgage") motion to dismiss 
Debry's Fourth Amended Complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure. The case involves numerous parties. 
The lower court, pursuant to Rule 54(d), Utah Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure, certified the order of dismissal for appeal. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
As this appeal arises from a motion to dismiss, the 
allegations contained in appellant's complaint are to be con-
strued in the light most favorable to the appellant, and all rea-
sonable inferences are construed in appellant's favor. Arrow 
Industries Inc. v. Zions First National Bank, 767 P.2d at 935 
(1988). For the purposes of this appeal, therefore, respondent 
Valley Mortgage will accept the allegations as set forth in the 
complaint, and reiterated by Debrys in the Statement of Facts set 
forth in their Brief. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
I. THE ORDER OF THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS DOES 
NOT CONSTITUTE A MANDATE. 
The Court of Appeals addressed only the appropriate 
standard of review and an order granting a motion to dismiss, and 
ruled that the trial had previously abused its discretion in 
denying Debrys' motion to amend their complaint against Valley 
Mortgage. The Court of Appeals specifically admonished Debrys 
that they are not free to make Valley Mortgage a defendant in 
hopes of turning up a claim against them in the course of 
discovery. 
II. THE COURT PROPERLY DISMISSED DEBRYS' AMENDED 
COMPLAINT. 
A. Preliminary Statement. 
Debrys do not allege a contractual or fiduciary rela-
tionship with Valley Mortgage. Absent a contractual obligation 
or fiduciary duty on the part of Valley Mortgage, there is abso-
lutely no basis under the alleged facts which by which Debrys 
effectively assert claims against Valley Mortgage. Shea v. H.S. 
Pickerell Co. , 748 P.2d 980 (N.M. Ct. App. 1987); Suqarhouse 
Finance Company v. Anderson, 610 P.2d 1369, 1373 (Utah 1980). 
B. Debrys Did Not State A Claim For Fraudulent 
Concealment. 
In order to hold a lender liable for the damages of a 
purchaser who did not borrow funds directly from that lender, as 
in the instant case, an independent duty must exist that runs 
-3-
from the lender to the purchaser. A lender owes no duty to oth-
ers to supervise the construction and development of projects it 
has financed. Davis v. Nevada National Bank, 737 P.2d 503 (Nev. 
1987). In order for failure to disclose facts to constitute 
fraud, there must be a duty to speak on behalf of the allegedly 
defending party. Suqarhouse Finance Company v. Anderson, 610 
P.2d 1369 (Utah 1980). 
C. Debrys Have Not Alleged A Claim For Fraudulent 
Misrepresentation. 
Debrys have not pled a claim for negligent misrepresen-
tation. A claim for negligent misrepresentation requires that an 
affirmative statement be made by the defendant without using rea-
sonable diligence to determine its accuracy. Galloway v. Afco 
Development, 777 P.2d 506 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
III. DEBRYS DO NOT PLEAD FACTS NECESSARY FOR FIND-
ING OF LIABILITY UNDER CONNER v. GREAT WEST-
ERN SAVINGS fc LOAN ASSOCIATION AND ITS 
PROGENY. 
A. The Court of Appeals Did Not Approve Conner v. 
Great Western Savings & Loan Association as the 
Standard in the State of Utah for a Lender Liabil-
ity Claim. 
In its opinion, the Court of Appeals did not review the 
underpinnings of Conner v. Great Western Savings & Loan 
Association, 73 Cal. Rptr. 369, 447 P.2d 609 (1968), nor did it 
analyze the shortcomings of Conner. The focus of the opinion of 
the Court of Appeals was simply that the trial court abused its 
discretion in denying Debrys1 prior motion to amend. 
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B. Conner v. Great Western Savings & Loan is Not 
Applicable in This Instance, 
Conner v. Great Western Savings & Loan Association only 
focuses on lenders1 and developers1 business dealings that exceed 
the traditional lender's function. Debrys do not allege facts 
which would demonstrate that Valley Mortgage's relationship with 
the developer exceeded the traditional lender's function. Conner 
is narrowly limited to its facts. Bradler v. Craig, 274 Cal. 
App. 2d 466, 79 Cal. Rptr. 401 (1969). 
IV. THE TRIAL COURT APPROPRIATELY DISMISSED 
DEBRYS1 FOURTH AMENDED COMPLAINT WITH 
PREJUDICE. 
Debrys have had ample opportunity to flesh out claims 
against Valley Mortgage and have failed. It is well within the 
discretion of a trial court to deny Debrys' leave to amend for a 
third time. Doe v. McMillan, 566 F.2d 713, 720 (D.C. 1977); 
Mertens v. Hummel, 587 F.2d 862, 865 (7th Cir. 1978). 
V. VALLEY MORTGAGE IS ENTITLED TO AN AWARD OF 
DAMAGES PURSUANT TO RULE 33, UTAH RULES OF 
APPELLATE PROCEDURE. 
Debrys' appeal of the District Court's Order of Dis-
missal is completely without merit and has been made without a 
reasonable likelihood of prevailing. The appeal far exceeds the 
"frivolous" standard enunciated in Mauqhan v. Mauqhanf 770 P. 2d 
156 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
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ARGUMENT 
I THE ORDER OF THE UTAH COURT OF A PPEALS DOES 
NOT CONSTITUTE A "MANDATE.-1 
• -r,. . ..... r .
 K.~ . - .. wourt of 
Appeals i: J; .dtr.- .-. 'mandate ^ .,. — t-,-;. r... - - p issues 
raise;: . t lie appeal. (A copy of the Opin .:-n , s a:: acred •>.-.,eto 
as Addendum "A",) Uebrys therefore claim cnat uitr opinion ;;i the 
Court of Appeals is i low the "law of the rase," and is r. . :ing 
upon the parties, the trial court, and any subsequent appellate 
court. D e b r y s !* a r g \ inie n t i s 11 i s p 1 a c e d . 
I n t he O p i i i i o n , 11 1 e Con i r t o f Appe a 1 s add r es s ed on 1 y t he 
appropriate standard of review i n an. order granting a motior I to 
dismiss, a n d r \ 11 e d t h a t t h e t r i a 1 c o I i r t I i a d p r e v i o I I s 1 y a b u s e d i t s 
discretion in denying I) e t u , , ' J 11 o f i < 111 t o a m e i i d t!: I e i r c o m p ] a i i 11 
against Valley Mortgage. (opinion al p, 4.) Debr ys leap on sub-
sequent dicta ot I he Court of Appeals to assert that the trial 
court must ai repf .is ii "mandate I haf H I M Uebrys are now permitted 
to allege causes ot action tor lender liability under Conner v. 
Great Western Savings & Loan Association, 7 3 Cal. Rptr. 369 , 44 7 
P.2d 609 (1 968) , f i ai id and neg11gent misrepresentation, " (Opin-
ion at p. 4 ) Debrys conveniently ignore the admonition ut rhe 
Court of Appeals, wl lich states in pertinent part: 
We do not suagest that Debry and thei r 
counsel are free * :> make Valley Mortgage a 
defendant and hope to turn up a claim against 
them in the course of discovery. On the con-
trary, each claim in the amended pleading 
must be "we] 1 groi ii ided in fact," as revealed 
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by "reasonable inquiry," as well as "war-
ranted by existing law or a good faith argu-
ment for the extension, modification, or 
reversal of existing law. . . ." (Citing 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 11). 
In direct defiance of the Court of Appeals' admonition, 
Debrys have interpreted the Opinion to assert that they are free 
to make Valley Mortgage a defendant in this matter. Debrys* 
assertion far exceeds the scope of the Opinion of the Court of 
Appeals. 
II. THE COURT PROPERLY DISMISSED DEBRYS' AMENDED 
COMPLAINT. 
A. Preliminary Statement. 
The allegations in the Fourth Amended Complaint all 
presuppose that Valley Mortgage owed a "duty" to Debrys, as pro-
spective purchasers of the subject building. Debrys do not 
allege a contractual relationship with Valley Mortgage, nor do 
they allege a relationship of the degree necessary to impose a 
recognized fiduciary duty upon Valley Mortgage. (Record at 9506, 
HH 251-277.) Absent a contractual obligation, or a fiduciary duty 
on the part of Valley Mortgage, there is absolutely no basis 
under the alleged facts by which Debrys effectively assert claims 
against Valley Mortgage. The Court, therefore, properly dis-
missed Debrys1 causes of action encompassed in paragraphs 251-277 
of the Amended Fourth Complaint. 
Under normal conditions, no lender should consider 
itself at risk if it elects not to generally inspect the progress 
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of the cons t ruc11on of the proj ect f i nanced by the 1ender , i 1 or is 
the 1 e n. d e r t o c o i 1 s i d e r 11 s e ] f 11 a b 1 e I f i t v o 1 u i i1 a r 11 y e 1 e c t s t o 
inspect ,r and does so i ieg 1 igei 111 y or i nef f ec11ve 1 y, See Davis v. 
Nevada National Bank, 7 3 7 P. 2 d 5 0 3 (N e v . 19 8 7) . See also Town 
Concrete Pipe of Washii iqtoi I , Inc v_, Redf ord , 71 / i ... 3 . *o4 
(Was i i. 198 6); Dugan v. First National Bank in Wichita, , > -2d 
1009 (Kan 1 9 8 0 ) . Construction lending is far more critical and 
exact ing , and presents far greater risks to the mortgagee, than 
does lend in g o n c o nip 1 e t e d s t r u c t u r e s ' r 1: i. e / a 1 u e o f r e a 1 e s t a t e 
for security purposes is ei it I rely dependent upon the happening of 
a future event - - comp 1 e11 on of the bu 11 d i ng or pro j ec:t. See 
Nelson & Whitman: Rea 1 Estate Finance Law, pp. 702 703 (2nd ed. 
19 8 5 ) , West P u b 1 i s h i n g C o m p a i I y, T h e 1 e n d e r , t h e r e £ o r e, e s t a b -
lishes c e r t a i n c o n t r o 1 s for its own benefit, to d e t e r m i n e ii Isofar 
as practi- able, f h ^ * f h e l u n i k , d i s h ' j ' M ' d t>y -
erly applied. Real Estate Finance Law, supra a ie 
that these control s are not established for \c ^ i e : . ' * Le 
b> ?• #er, or, as Debrys woi ill d have it, for I «- - ~* * _,r uure-
1a 11 : t h1rd - p art j pu r c h a s e rs o f t h e c omp1e t ed s t ruc t ure, 
It is a x i oma 11 c t h a t a 1 e g a 1 p r o c e e d I n g m a y o n 1 y b e 
maintained w i11 i a J 1 eg a 11o ns o f a ca use o f ac 11 o n t ha t i s cog niz a-
b 1 e a t 1 aw, See Estes v, Talbot, 5 9 7 i >". 2 d ] 3 2 4 (I 11 a 1 i 1 9 ? 9 ) As 
s t a t ed p re v i o us 1 y, D e b ry s re adi1y admit t h a t t h e y do no t po sse s s 
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a fiduciary relationship with Valley Mortgage, nor is there 
privity of contract between Debrys and Valley Mortgage. 
An independent analysis of each of Debrys' claims 
against Valley Mortgage demonstrates that the trial court prop-
erly granted Valley Mortgage's motion to dismiss, 
B. Debrys Did Not State A Claim For Fraudulent 
Concealment. 
In their first claim for relief, Debrys claim that the 
decision of the Court of Appeals provides them carte blanche to 
bring Valley Mortgage into this case, without regard to recog-
nized legal principles of pleading fraud with particularity, or 
asserting a "duty" requisite for stating a cause of action based 
upon fraudulent concealment. 
In order to hold a lender liable for the damages of a 
purchaser who did not borrow funds directly from that lender, as 
in the instant case, an independent duty must exist that runs 
from the lender to the purchaser. It is well established, how-
ever, that a lender owes no duty to others to supervise the con-
struction and development of projects which it has financed. 
Armada v. Cleveland Realty Investors, 359 So.2d 540 (Fla. Dist. 
Ct. App. 1978); Schaefer v. Gilmerf 353 So.2d 847 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 
App. 1977); Davis v. Nevada National Bank, supra; Town Concrete 
Pipe of Washington, Inc. v. Redford, supra; Duqan v. First 
National Bank in Wichita, supra; Schenectedy Savings Bank v. 
Bartosik, 77 Misc. 2d 837, 353 N.Y.S.2d 706 (1974). Shea v. H.S. 
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Pickerell Co. , 74 3 P. 2d 980 (N.M. _ App. 1987 ) ; Real Estate 
Finance Lav, supra. 
The Utah Supreme Court acknowledges that In order for 
failure t o d isc1o se fa c t s t o co n s111u t e fraud, there m u s t 1 • e a 
d \ 11 y t: o s p e a k o i: i b e 1 I a ] f o f 1.11 <• * a il 1 e g e d i y o f f e n d n n j p... j r t y. 
Suqarhouse Finance Company v. Anderson, fa I 0 P. 2d 1. Jfa9 , 1 J 7 i (iJtah 
1980) (fraudulent misrepresentation may be made either by an 
affirmati e stat ;emi ^ -. . n , omission, where there exists 
a duty :. speu- -.nee Valley Mortaage had no dutv whatsoever 
t^ r .-:>:%: *c* necessar * .. 
i>'^ .'.:!i wnetner ueoxyb dUtrqudtel . -o e 
r
 . . ' d .f f n<=*brys ^n 7Pa1n\islv seen
 k .,-a 
is COnSp * .^j»>b w :I DCN * , 'ny„ - Ad ( * 
alleged Debrys -u**^ - i *f 
above, t 
for frau.- . ,f * ^ ealment agair : , r, ^  -• jage. 
C. Debrys Have Not Alleged A Claim For Negligent 
Misrepresentation, 
Debrys also allege that, as a coi istruction lender, Val-
1 e y M11 r t IJ a q e w a s a w a r e o r s h o 1 11 d h a \ e b e e 1 1 a w a r e , o 1 k 1 1 e w o r 
should have k 1 1 ow 1 1, 11 1 at var Ious crite 1 ia n:iust be met before the 
building would pass inspection. Debrys contend that "Valley Mort 
gag e neq 1 i gently _ represented JD£ _ impl i cation (1) the C o u n t y h a d 
i ssued a bu i Id I ng perm i t; ( 2 ) t! ite bu i Id i ng was const rue ted 
a c c o r d i n g t o C o u n t y a p p r o v e d p 1. a n s; a n d ( 3 ) t h e b u i 1 d i n g w a s 
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^ * r . -a * 
e l e m e n t s 
as^ : . d* 
f (• 
*/> 
a .' 
1-- * 
t o 
j u c i . 
- -iue 
* -. a s 
* :>rth 
i 1 Jit 
complete and ready for occupancy. Alternatively, Debrys allege 
that Valley Mortgage had a duty to disclose the defects and vio-
lations to Debry. (Record at H 9507, para 254-65.) 
A claim based on negligent misrepresentation requires 
that an affirmative statement be made by the defendant without 
using reasonable diligence to determine its accuracy. See 
Galloway v. Afco Development. 777 P.2d 506 (Ut. Ct. App. 1989). 
Although negligent misrepresentation does not require an intent 
to deceive, the law imposes a requirement that the negligent 
misrepresenter affirmatively make a statement which is false. 
Galloway, supra. 
Debrys do not plead that Valley Mortgage ever made a 
statement to them regarding the condition of the property. With-
out this pleading, Debrys1 claim for negligent misrepresentation 
must fail. See Christenson v. Commonwealth Land Title Insurance 
Co., 666 P.2d 302, 305-306 (Utah 1983); Duqan v. Jones, 615 P.2d 
1239, 1246 (Utah 1980); Jardine v. Brunswick Corp., 18 Utah 2d 
378, 423 P.2d 659, 662 (1967); Restatement (Second) of Torts 
S 552 (1965). 
Recognizing this infirmity in their complaint, Debrys 
bootstrap an unabashed argument that Valley Mortgage, in making 
the construction loan, represented "by implication" that the 
builder was a licensed contractor and had complied with state and 
county laws. (Record at 9507, H 269.) Valley Mortgage has not 
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unearthed any case law which supports Debrys 1 claim; as stated 
p r e v i o u s J y a ] 1 c o i 11 r o 1 s i n ip 1 e m, e i 1.1 e d I: y t h e 1 e i i d e r a r e s t r i c 11 y 
for t h e b e n e f i t o f t h e 1 e n d e r , n o t u i i r e 1 a t ed purchasers. C o n -
tro.,; implemented by VaJ 1 ej Mortgage cannot be considered an 
" • - * • .; i v e s t a t e n i e i i, t " \ 11 I ci e i: a n y s t r e 1: c h o f i in a g i i i, a t i o i I . rxeal 
Estate Finance Lav, supra, pp. 702 ?03 ; 7 96. 
Debrys assert that, in support of i ts mot ion to d i s -
mi ss, Va] 1 ey Mor tgage argued that it "could not be 1iable for its 
concea lmei its ai id in i s represent at ions because there was no con t rac-
tuaJ pr iv ity betvi eei i it and the Debrys." Appellant" s Brief 
p. 31. This assertion i s a i I e xamp1e o f Debrys 1 mis c ha r a c-
t erizations of the r e c o r d, a i i d t o r 11 11 e ci d i s t o r t i o i i s • :> f 11 i e a p p 1 i -
cabl e law. I * *: -.: • .*. 1 1 ey Mortgage argued as its 
legal focal poir • -•..*: .i/se.v 1 contractual obligation, or a 
f iduciary dut • ending ir.< " - is 
absolutely nr- L as under * ^  alleged facts ; / -**:*': J^L:/s may 
effectively a^eri « ^*U*.L against Valley Mj-iga^. ..'.ecc;j at 
97 55 62, ) 
Whether Valley Mortgage knew or shoi;..- f-.-r. ^  *™0^n the 
facts as alleged by Debrys is inconsequent i. . ' t..e. Mor* ^ age 
never represented to Debrys that matteis wci>
 3;- • • t- ere j-t . 
Hence, there existed no duty on the part of V'al ] ey M<ii'i:;a^^ *.o 
make any disclosures to DeBrys. Christensen v. Commonwealth Land 
Title Insur anc e Compa n y, 666 p,2d 302 (Utah I ^ G J / ; AI izona 
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Title Insurance & Trust Company v. O'Malley Lumber Company, 14 
Ariz. App. 486, 484 P.2d 639 (1971) (defendant has no duty to 
speak or even respond to inquiries, but, if it chose to speak, 
the court then imposed a duty to exercise reasonable care in mak-
ing representations about presently ascertainable facts); In Re 
Commercial Investments, 92 B.R. 488, 493 (D.N.M. 1988) (mere 
knowledge that there was a contract to purchase the structure 
when construction was completed did not impose any duty on 
financial institutions to account for expenditure of funds from 
construction loan, or to monitor expenditure of those funds for 
benefit of the purchaser). 
All cases cited by Debrys in support of their argument 
for negligent misrepresentation contain facts which demonstrate 
that the negligent party — actually, affirmatively — repre-
sented carelessly or negligently certain facts which proved to be 
untrue. These facts are conspicuously absent in the present 
case. Debrys have not alleged, and cannot, allege facts to dem-
onstrate that Valley Mortgage, under any circumstances, affirma-
tively represented anything to them. 
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Ill DEBRYS DO NOT PLEAD FACTS NECESSARY FOR A 
FINDING OF LIABILITY UNDER CONNER v. GREAT 
WESTERN SAVINGS & LOAN ASSOCIATION AND ITS 
PROGENY. 
A, The Court of Appeals Did Not Approve Conner v. 
Great Western Savings & Loan Association as the 
Standard in the State of Utah for a Lender Liabil-
ity Claim, 
D e b r y s a s s e r t t h a t 11 1 e U t a 1 i C o 1 i r t o £ A p p e a I s , i i 1 Va l -
ley, accepted Conner as the standard in Utah for a lender liabil-
ity c 1 a i Jit (App e 11 a n t' s B r i e f p. 3 0 , ) T h e C o u r t o f App e a 1 s did 
not h i n g o f t h e s o i t , T h e f ::) c u s o f 11 I e Op i n i o n o f ' * .; - f 
Appeals was simply that the trial cour t abused its discret ion in 
denying Deb rys' p i io r Mo 11o i i t o A M e i I d. T h e Cour t o f Appeals 
r e v e r s e d a i i d r e in a i I • ::i e d s o 11: I a t I) e b r y s c o u 1 d a m e n d t h e i r :: o in p J a I n t 
ag ains t Va 11e y Mo r t gag e. Opi nion a t p 4 
The Court of Appeals did not review the underpinnings 
of 11: ie Coi u ter dec i s I oi i, i Io:s d I d 11 ai ia 1 yze 11 ie shor tconi i ngs of 
* '
s e
 Conner dec i s ion. That the Cour t :>f Appea 1 s d id not i i Itend 
t h a - i t s op i n i o n h a v e p r e c ede n t i a 1 v a J u e i s f u r t h e r bo r n e o i 11: by 
the fact that the decision of the C :•• •* -upt-al s, at its direc-
t i o r i , w a s o r d e r e d " ' i I o t f o r p u b ] i c a t . . i o i I a t p g . . ) . 
B, Conner v, Great Western Savings & Loan is Not 
Applicable in This Instance. 
Even If this Court should adopt. Conner v. Great Western 
Savings & Loan Association as law Ii i t Jtah, the facts alleged by 
DeBry do not apply to the Cal I f ornia c : -\ irt * s rul i i lg . 
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Conner v. Great Western Savings & Loan Assoc, illus-
trates California's liberal view of lender liability. In 
Conner, Great Western Savings & Loan Assoc, the lender, made a 
construction loan to a developer of a large tract of land in 
Southern California. The loan agreement significantly involved 
the savings and loan association in developing the tract. First, 
Great Western retained the right of first refusal to make 
2 
l o n g - t e r m mor tgages t o t h e buye r s of t h e home. I d . a t 8 5 8 . 
Second, Grea t Western had t h e r i g h t t o warehouse t h e t r a c t of 
3 
l and u n t i l t h e d e v e l o p e r began u s i n g t h e p r o p e r t y . I d . a t 859 . 
T h i r d , Grea t Western had t h e r i g h t t o r e f u s e t o d i s b u r s e funds if 
4 t h e c o n s t r u c t i o n d i d not conform t o p l a n s and s p e c i f i c a t i o n s . 
S e e
 Note, Mortgage Lender L i a b i l i t y t o the Purchasers of New or Ex i s t ing 
Homes, 1988 Univ. of I l l i n o i s L. Rev., pp. 191, 195-201. 
2
 The terms of the agreement requi red the developer to inform p o t e n t i a l 
purchasers that Great Western was wi l l i ng to make long-term loans to approved 
pe r sons . If an approved buyer wished to ob ta in a long-term loan elsewhere, 
even a f t e r Great Western had met the terms of the other f inancing, the d e v e l -
oper was ob l iga t ed t o pay Great Western the fees and i n t e r e s t obtained by the 
o ther lend in connection with the loan. Id . a t 861. 
3
 Great Western received a 20% c a p i t a l gain by warehousing the land. Id . 
a t 864. 
4
 Great Western inspected the cons t ruc t ion s i t e s weekly t o ve r i fy t h a t the 
bu i lde r was following the plans and tha t the lender was d i sburs ing funds only 
for work completed. Id . a t 862. 
- 1 5 -
The plaintiffs in Conner were individuals who purchased 
single family homes in a tract development. Because the 
ill-designed foundations of their homes could not withstand the 
expansion and contraction of adobe soil, the plaintiffs suffered 
serious damages. The plaintiffs sought recision or damages from 
the savings and loan association and the developer. Id. at 856. 
Finding that the developer negligently constructed the homes and 
ignored soil conditions prevalent at the site, the court allowed 
the plaintiffs to recover against the developer. The developer, 
however, was unable to pay damages. Id. at 859. 
The California court held that Great Western had a 
"duty to the buyers of the homes to exercise reasonable care to 
protect them from damages caused by major structural defects. 
Id. at 867. In imposing this duty on Great Western, the court 
relied on the lender's and the developer's business dealings that 
exceeded the traditional lender's function. Describing this 
relationship with Great Western, the court stated: 
Great Western voluntarily undertook 
business relationships with [the builder] to 
develop the Weathersfield tract and to 
develop a market for the tract houses in 
which prospective buyers would be directed to 
Great Western for their financing. In under-
taking these relationships, Great Western 
became much more than a lender content to 
lend money at interest on the security of 
real property. It became an active partici-
pant in a home construction enterprise. It 
had the right to exercise extensive control 
of the enterprise. Its financing, which made 
the enterprise possible, took on ramifica-
tions beyond the domain of the usual money 
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lender. It received not only interest on its 
construction loans, but also substantial fees 
for making them, a 20% capital gain for 
"warehousing" the land, and protection from 
loss of profits in the event individual home 
buyers sought permanent financing elsewhere. 
Id. at 864. 
Nowhere have Debrys alleged extensive involvement by 
Valley Mortgage which might subject it to the extreme reredy 
doled out in Conner. Essentially, Debrys allege only that Valley 
Mortgage knew or should have known that a developer was presum-
ably unqualified. The facts in Debrys' case are completely dis-
similar. 
The Conner standard enunciated by the California 
Supreme Court does not apply, as the imposition of liability on 
the lender in the Conner case is only upon one "significantly 
involved in developing a new housing tract." Conner at 864. 
Developments after the Conner decision have reinforced a narrow 
reading of the case* A subsequent California case interpreted 
Conner as applying only to the particular facts of the case. See 
Bradler v. Craig, 274 Cal. App. 2d 466, 79 Cal. Rptr. 401 (1969). 
Additionally, the California legislature in 1970 limited the 
5 
scope of the Conner decision. 
The trial court, in dismissing Debrys' complaint for 
the second time, correctly recognized that, in imposing the duty 
Note, Mortgage Lender Liability, fn.2, supra. 
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upon Great Western in Conner, the California court relied upon 
the lender's business relationship with the builder. Judge Brian 
specifically found that Debrys had not, and could not, represent 
that Valley Mortgage engaged in any type of activity or behavior, 
or conduct that would suggest that the standards set forth in the 
Conner v. Great Western Savings & Loan case should apply in the 
case before the court." (Record at 10932.) He ruled that "if 
the Conner case standard were applied, however, . . . there had 
been no representations or pleadings by Debrys that demonstrated 
that Valley Mortgage was anything other than a standard lending 
institution in the Cascade building project, and that the 
pleadings did not allege egregious, outrageous or commercially 
inappropriate behavior by Valley Mortgage in its involvement 
with the Cascade project." (Record at 10932.) See also, Bradler 
v. Craiqy supra at 475-76. 
Although Debrys insist that there is "no logical rea-
son" why the law should not protect persons in their position, a 
compelling logical reason is readily apparent. (Appellant Brief 
at p. 27.) To hold Valley Mortgage liable as a construction 
lender for defects in the building would require all lending 
institutions to discard their traditional roles and, in essence, 
become joint venturers or partners with any builder to whom they 
loaned money. 
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Debrys f a i l e d in the lower cour t , and have f a i l e d on 
appeal to c i t e one case which holds t h a t , s imply because V a l l e y 
Mortgage i s involved in the c o n s t r u c t i o n p r o c e s s , i t i s l i a b l e 
for d e f e c t s d i scovered in the s t r u c t u r e a f t e r s a l e to an unre-
l a t e d t h i r d p a r t y . Most courts that have addressed the i s s u e 
d i s t i n g u i s h or o u t r i g h t r e j e c t the holding in Conner„ and permit 
lending i n s t i t u t i o n s to avoid l i a b i l i t y under the very c la ims 
p o s i t e d by Debrys. 
Debrys p l a c e great r e l i a n c e on Fikes v . F i r s t Federal 
Savings & Loan A s s o c i a t i o n , 533 P.2d 251 (Alaska 1973) , c la iming 
that the c e n t r a l i s s u e fac ing the court in Fikes was whether a 
lender has a duty to p r o t e c t the t h i r d party i n t e r e s t of which 
the lender has knowledge. Debrys then e x t r a p o l a t e that i s s u e , to 
a s s e r t that Debrys had a reasonable e x p e c t a t i o n that V a l l e y 
b
 For courts making a d i s t inc t ion based upon the lack of extensive 
involvement of the lender in a project , see the following: Drake v . Morris 
Plan Company, 53 Cal. App. 3d 208, 125 Cal. Rptr. 667 (1976) (no lender l i a -
b i l i t y for wrongful death for financing sale of automobile for incompetent, 
unlicensed dr iver) ; Fox N. Carskadon Financial Corporation v . San Francisco 
Savings & Loan Association, 52 Cal. App. 3d 484, 125 Cal. Rptr. 549 (1975) (no 
lender l i a b i l i t y to apartment building purchaser who l o s t equity in forec lo -
sure); Skerlec v . Wells Fargo Bank, a National Association, 18 Cal. App. 3d 
1003, 96 Cal. Rptr. 434 (1971) (no lender l i a b i l i t y in tort to p l a i n t i f f 
injured in c o l l i s i o n where the lender knew the automobile purchaser could not 
comply with f inancial respons ib i l i ty law); Bradler v. Craig, supra (no l i a b i l -
i t y in lender for construction defect in house in the absence of extraordinary 
lender involvement in the project ) ; L.A. Christensen v. Philcent Corp., 226 
Pa. Super. 157, 313 A.2d 249 (1973) (no lender l i a b i l i t y to home purchasers 
for construction defect in absence of Conner-like f a c t s ) ; Shea v. H.S. 
Pickerel 1 Co., 748 P.2d 980 (N.M. App. 1987) (no duty on part of lender to 
protect purchaser from al leged tort ious a c t s ) . 
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Mortgage would perform its role as a construction lender in a 
conventional manner. In reliance upon Conner and Fikes, Debrys 
attempt to shift the duty as arms length purchasers in an arms 
length transaction to Valley Mortgage. Fikes, and all other 
cases cited by Debrys in support of this argument have a common 
ground — that the aggrieved party in the transaction held some 
sort of interest in the property at some time while construction 
was underway. This critical point is missing in Debrys* 
argument. 
Decisions in other states support the district court's 
dismissal of DeBry's action. (See fn. 6, supra. ) For example, 
in Shea v. H. S. Pickerell Co., 748 P.2d 980 (N.M. App. 1987), 
plaintiff filed suit against Pickerell for breach of duty by a 
mortgage lender, negligent entrustment of funds, failure to warn 
and protect a purchaser, and aiding, assisting and encouraging 
another to commit tortious acts. Pickerell filed a motion to 
dismiss Shea's claim, following the filing of the initial com-
plaint. The trial court allowed Shea to file an amended com-
plaint, which Pickerell again successfully moved to dismiss, this 
time with prejudice. 
The pivotal question in Shea v. H. S. Pickerell 
involved the scope of a construction lender's duty to protect a 
third party purchaser from the tortious acts of a borrower or 
seller. 
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The New Mexico court properly upheld the dismissal of 
Shea's amended complaint and determined that the holding in 
Conner v. Great Western Savings & Loan Association is not appli-
cable because Shea, like DeBrys, could not allege that she 
consummated the loan from Pickerell. ,Id. at 983. Thus, the 
court found that Shea had failed to establish the existence of a 
duty on the part of Pickerell to protect her from alleged 
tortious acts. 
Because Debrys have failed to allege a specific duty on 
the part of Valley Mortgage, or demonstrate that Valley Mortgage 
maintained an interest in the construction project which exceeded 
the scope of a normal mortgage lender, Debrys' complaint fails to 
rise to the level necessary to state a cause of action under 
Conner v. Great Western Savings & Loan Association and its prog-
eny. The district court properly ruled that absent such a show-
ing, Debrys did not plead a cause of action recognizable in the 
State of Utah, and therefore properly dismissed Debrys1 Fourth 
Amended Complaint as against Valley Mortgage. 
IV. THE TRIAL COURT APPROPRIATELY DISMISSED 
DEBRYS1 FOURTH AMENDED COMPLAINT WITH 
PREJUDICE. 
A motion to dismiss is properly granted when it appears 
that plaintiff cannot recover or be entitled to relief under any 
stated facts provable under the claim. Arrow Industries, supra. 
Whether or not negligence has occurred is generally a question of 
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fact; however, a finding of fraud or negligence is dependent upon 
the existence of a duty on the part of the defendant. Whether a 
duty exists is a matter of law. Schwartz v. Tanner, 576 P.2d 875 
(1978); Shea v. H.S. Pickerell Co., supra at 982. 
This action was filed over 4 years ago. Valley Mort-
gage's records were subpoenaed and the deposition of its Custo-
dian of Records was taken on March 31, 1986. (Record at 491). 
The full extent of Valley Mortgage's relationship with the 
builder, Cascade Construction, could be gleaned from these 
records as well as depositions of Cascade's principals. Debrys 
have had sufficient opportunity to "flesh out" their claims 
against Valley Mortgage, and they have failed. The district 
court provided Debrys over three months from the date of the 
hearing on Valley Mortgage's Motion to Dismiss to allow Debrys to 
"flesh out" facts which would permit them to state cognizable 
causes of action. 
The court went to great lengths to permit Debrys addi-
tional discovery, and Debrys came up empty-handed. (Appellants 
Brief at 35.) For this reason, it is well within the discretion 
of the trial court to deny Debrys leave to amend. See Doe v. 
McMillan, 566 F.2d 713, 720 (D.C. 1977); Mertens v. Hummel, 587 
F.2d 862, 865 (7th Cir. 1978). 
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V. VALLEY MORTGAGE IS ENTITLED TO AN AWARD OF 
DAMAGES PURSUANT TO RULE 33
 f UTAH RULES OF 
APPELLATE PROCEDURE. 
Debrys ignored the admonition of the Utah Court of 
Appeals, and instead they have recklessly amended their Com-
plaint. Valley Mortgage once again was obliged to defend against 
Debrys' frivolous claims, which have no basis in fact or law. 
Debrys1 appeal of the District Court's Order of Dismissal is 
totally without merit, and in this light, has been made without a 
reasonable likelihood of prevailing. Thus, Debrys' appeal far 
exceeds the "frivolous" standard enunciated in Mauqhan v. 
Mauqhan, 770 P.2d 156 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) and O'Brien v. Rush, 
744 P.2d 306 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). Pursuant to Rule 33, Rules of 
Appellate Procedure, Valley Mortgage requests this Court take 
appropriate measures and determine appropriate damages to be 
awarded Valley Mortgage as a result of this appeal. 
CONCLUSION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has not adopted Conner v. 
Great Western Savings & Loan as the law to be applied in Utah on 
the issue of lender liability. Even if Conner was recognized in 
good law in the State of Utah, the facts as alleged in Debrys 
Complaint are not applicable. Debrys do not state a claim for 
fraudulent concealment or negligent misrepresentation. Debrys 
had adequate time and resources to "flesh out1' any claims against 
Valley Mortgage, and have failed to do so. It was within the 
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discretion of the trial court to dismiss their action. Valley 
Mortgage is entitled to an award of damages. 
Based upon the foregoing, Valley Mortgage respectfully 
requests this Court affirm the Order of the District Court dis-
missing the Complaint with prejudice. 
DATED this l/>^day of May, 1991. 
lu^t^^ I* 
THOMAS R. GRI! 
of and for 
PARSONS BEHLE & LATIMER 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
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Robert J. Debry and Joan 
Debry, 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
Valley Mortgage Company, 
et al. , 
Defendant and Respondent. 
OPINION 
(Not For Publication) 
Case No. 880255-CA 
Third District, Salt Lake County 
The Honorable Pat B. Brian 
F I L E D 
CI«KKcf 1r* Court 
Uiah Court Q\ App««ris 
Attorneys: Dale F. Gardiner and Robert J. Debry, Salt Lake City, 
for Appellants 
Roy G. Haslam and Thomas R. Grisley, Salt Lake City, 
for Respondent 
Before Judges Billings, Greenwood, and Orme. 
BILLINGS, Judge: 
The trial court granted respondent Valley Mortgage 
Company's ("Valley Mortgage") motion to dismiss appellant 
Robert J. and Joan Debrys* ("Debrys") complaint, under Utah R. 
Civ. P. 12(b)(6), for failure to state a claim upon which 
relief can be granted. Debrys appeal from this decision 
claiming the trial court should have allowed them to amend 
their complaint to cure any defects or, in the alternative, the 
complaint adequately stated a claim for relief. 
FACTS 
We recite the facts as alleged in Debrys' complaint. 
Debrys purchased a newly constructed office building located at 
4252 South 700 East in Salt Lake City, Utah, from the builder, 
Cascade Enterprises ("builder"). Valley Mortgage was the 
construction lender on the building and secured its loan 
through a deed of trust. When the building was sold to Debrys, 
the builder repaid Valley Mortgage from the sale proceeds. 
3--e3i$ia$2 
After the sale, Debrys claimed to have discovered serious 
construction defects in the office building. Debrys claimed 
they would not have purchased the building had they known about 
the defects. As a result, Debrys filed a complaint naming 
nineteen defendants including Valley Mortgage. Debrys1 
complaint stated the following claim against Valley Mortgage: 
In connection with [Valley Mortgage's] 
activities as a construction lender, 
[Valley Mortgage] was aware, or should 
have been aware, that no valid building 
permit was obtained for the building. 
Furthermore, [Valley Mortgage] knew, or 
should have known, that the required 
inspections were not conducted on the 
building by County officials. 
[Valley Mortgage] had a duty to disclose 
the true facts to plaintiffs. [Valley 
Mortgage] failed to disclose the true 
facts to plaintiffs. 
Plaintiffs allege on information and 
belief that [Valley Mortgage] failed to 
disclose the true facts to plaintiffs 
because the construction loan was 
delinquent and [Valley Mortgage] wanted to 
avoid the time, cost and risk of 
foreclosure proceedings. 
By reason of [Valley Mortgage's] conduct 
as alleged above, plaintiffs have 
purchased a building that is neither 
habitable nor marketable. If the contract 
between plaintiffs and Cascade Enterprises 
is not rescinded, plaintiffs will be 
damaged in the amount of the cost of the 
building, plus improvements, plus 
interest. The exact amount of such damage 
is not yet known. 
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Valley Mortgage moved to dismiss the complaint under Utah 
R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which 
relief can be granted. At oral argument on Valley Mortgage's 
motion and in response to contentions that Debrys had not 
stated their claim in sufficient detail, Debrys requested leave 
to amend their complaint to set forth their claims with greater 
particularity. Although the trial court had allowed Debrys to 
amend their complaint on two previous occasions in response to 
motions brought by other defendants, this was Debrys' first 
request to amend their claim against Valley Mortgage. The 
trial court denied Debrys* request and granted Valley 
Mortgage's motion to dismiss. This appeal followed. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
"A motion to dismiss is only appropriate where it appears 
to a certainty that the plaintiff would not be entitled to 
relief under any state of facts which could be proved in 
support of its claim.- Arrow Indus., Inc. v. Zions First Nat'l 
Bank, 767 P.2d 935, 936 (Utah 1988). See also Freegard v. 
First W. Nat'l Bank, 738 P.2d 614, 616 (Utah 1987). "In 
reviewing an order granting a motion to dismiss, we are obliged 
to construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the 
plaintiff and to indulge all reasonable inferences in its 
favor." Arrow Indus., 767 P.2d at 936. See also Penrod v. Nu 
Creation Creme, Inc., 669 P.2d 873, 875 (Utah 1983); Barrus v. 
Wilkinson, 16 Utah 2d 204, 398 P.2d 207, 208 (1965); Baur v. 
Pacific Fin. Corp., 14 Utah 2d 283, 383 P.2d 397, 397 (1963). 
MOTION TO AMEND COMPLAINT 
Leave to amend a pleading is a matter within the broad 
discretion of the trial court, and we will not disturb its 
determinations absent an abuse of discretion resulting in 
prejudice to the party. Chadwick v. Nielson, 763 P.2d 817, 820 
(Utah Ct. App. 1988). See also Girard v. Appleby, 660 P.2d 
245, 247 (Utah 1983); Staker v. Huntington Cleveland Irrigation 
Co.. 664 P.2d 1188, 1190 (Utah 1983). In exercising its 
discretion, the trial court should consider a motion to amend 
"in light of all the circumstances and grant or deny it in the 
interest of fairness and substantial justice.- Girard, 660 
P.2d at 247. See also Gillman v. Hansen, 26 Utah 2d 165, 486 
P.2d 1045, 1046 (1971). The rule in Utah is "to allow 
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amendments freely where justice requires, and especially is 
this true before trial.- Gillman, 486 P.2d at 1046. See also 
Tripp v. Vauohn, 746 P.2d 794, 797 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). 
Moreover, a trial court Mmust have sufficient grounds to 
apply the 'harsh and permanent remedy1 of a dismissal with 
prejudice." Intermountain Physical Medicine Assocs. v. 
Micro-Dex Corp., 739 P.2d 1131, 1133 (Utah Ct. App. 1987) 
(trial court abused its discretion in not allowing amendment or 
granting continuance so plaintiff could include indispensable 
parties). See also Bonneville Tower Condominium Management 
Comm. v. Thompson Michie Assocs., 728 P.2d 1017, 1020 (Utah 
1986) (trial court should have dismissed without prejudice for 
plaintiffs* failure to join indispensable parties); Gillman, 
486 P.2d at 1046-47 (trial court abused its discretion by 
refusing to allow defendant to amend its answer by filing a 
counterclaim). 
In the instant case, the trial court denied Debrys* oral 
motion to amend its complaint to allege with greater 
specificity its cause of action against Valley Mortgage. The 
court denied the motion and dismissed the claim against Valley 
Mortgage with prejudice. This ruling was particularly harsh 
because it was made in advance of trial where there was no 
evidence of prejudice or undue delay in allowing Debrys to 
amend its claim. Accordingly, we find the trial court abused 
its discretion in denying the motion to amend. We reverse and 
remand so that Debrys may amend their complaint against Valley 
Mortgage. 
In their amended complaint, Debrys should set forth with 
particularity each cause of action in which they seek redress 
i.e., lender liability under Connor v. Great W. Sav. & Loan 
Ass'n, 73 Cal. Rptr. 369, 447 P.2d 609 (1968), fraud, and 
negligent misrepresentation. These causes of action are fact 
sensitive, and therefore, proper disposition may. not be 
determined until adequate discovery has fleshed out the 
880255-CA 0223f 
relevant facts.1 See, e.g., Drake v. Morris Plan Co. of 
California, 53 Cal. App. 3d 208, 125 Cal. Rptr. 667, 670 
(1975); Fikes v. First Fed. Sav. and Loan Ass'n of Anchorage, 
533 P.2d 251, 259-61 (Alaska 1975); Christiansen v. Philcent 
Corp., 226 Pa. Super. 157, 313 A.2d 249 (1973). 
It would be inappropriate for this court to rule that in no 
circumstances and under no set of facts could Valley Mortgage, 
as a construction lender, be held liable to Debrys as 
subsequent purchasers of a project financed by Valley 
Mortgage. Based on the foregoing, we reverse the trial court's 
judgment and grant^Jthe-DQbrys • leave to amend their complaint. 
Judith M. Billings, Judge 
WE CONCUR: 
Pamela^S. Greenwood, Judge 
Gregory K. Orme, Judge 
1. In so stating, we do not suggest that Debry and their 
counsel are free to make Valley Mortgage a defendant and hope 
to turn up a claim against them in the course of discovery. On 
the contrary, each claim in the amended pleading must be Hwell 
grounded in fact,H as revealed by -reasonable inquiry,w as well 
as "warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for the 
extension, modification, or reversal of existing law . . . ." 
Utah R. Civ. P. 11. 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
* * * * * * * * 
ROBERT J. DEBRY and JOAN DEBRY, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
CASCADE ENTERPRISES, a general 
partnership; DEL K. BARTEL; 
DALE THURGOOD; ROBERT G. HILL; 
UTAH TITLE AND ABSTRACT CO.; 
CASCADE CONSTRUCTION, a general 
partnership; LEE ALLEN BARTEL; 
SALMON & ALDER, INC.; WILLIAM 
TRIGGER dba TRIGGER ROOFING; 
ZEPHYR ELECTRIC, INC.; SCOTT 
MCDONALD REALTY, INC.; STANLEY 
POSTMA; TRI-K CONTRACTORS; KEN 
BAR MANUFACTURING COMPANY; 
GRANDEUR HOME BUILDERS 
COMPONENTS; SOTER KNUDSEN; VAN 
ELLSWORTH dba DRAFTING 
UNLIMITED; CANADA LIFE INSURANCE 
COMPANY; BUILDING SYSTEMS, INC.; 
FIDELITY NATIONAL TITLE 
INSURANCE CO.; MOUNTAIN STATES 
TELEPHONE AND TELEGRAPH COMPANY; 
AMERICAN ASPHALT PAVING; 
BACKMAN TITLE COMPANY; J.F. 
SMITH dba SMITH & JOHNSON LAND 
& TITLE COMPANY; VALLEY 
MORTGAGE CO.; UNITED BANK; THE 
HARTFORD, CENTREX, INC.; AND 
ZIONS LEASING COMPANY, 
FINDINGS AND ORDER OF 
DISMISSAL OF VALLEY 
MORTGAGE COMPANY 
Civil No. C86-553 
Judge Pat B. Brian 
Defendants. 
CASCADE CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, 
DEL K. BARTEL and DALE THURGOOD, 
Third-Party, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
ROBERT J. DEBRY * ASSOCIATES, 
KUISK & DEBRY, INC., DAVID M.' 
JORGENSEN, BRADFORD DE3RY, 
STERLING GUSTAFSON,. THOMPSON St 
SONS KEATING & AIR CONDITIONING 
COMPANY, INC., and JOHN DOES 
1 THROUGH 50, 
Third-Party 
Defendants. 
The motion to dismiss the causes of action set forth 
against Valley Mortgage Company in DeBrys1 Fourth Amended Com-
plaint came on for hearing on the 28th day of March, 1990 before 
the Honorable Pat 3. Brian, Edward T. Wells, Robert DeBry & 
Associates, appeared on behalf of the plaintiffs, Robert Debry 
and Joan Debry, and Thomas R. Grisley, Parsons, Behle « Latimer, 
appeared on behalf of the defendant, Valley Mortgage Company. 
The Court having heard the arguments of counsel, and 
having reviewed the contents of the file, and otherwise being 
full advised under the premises, hereby makes the following 
findings and order: 
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FINDINGS 
1. In their Fourth Amended Complaint, De3rys have set 
forth three causes of action against Valley Mortgage. Debrys 
have alleged that Valley Mortgage: 
(a) Concealed facts (claim for concealment); 
(b) Misrepresented facts (negligent misrepresen-
tation; or 
(c) Intentionally engaged in behavior that 
resulted in a detriment to the De3rys (lender liability). 
2. With regard to the cause of action for conceal-
ment, the Court finds that the Debrys have not represented, 
either in argument or in memorandum, that Valley Mortgage inten-
tionally misrepresented anything on which the DeBrvs relied to 
their detriment, or that Valley Mortgage fraudulently engaged in 
any behavior which resulted in injury to the DeBrys. 
3. Under DeBrvs1 second cause of action for negligent 
misrepresentation, the Court specifically finds that there has 
been no representation in argument, or upon facts set forth in 
memorandum to substantiate that Valley Mortgage owed a duty to 
the DeBrys. 
4. DeBrys1 third cause of action is based upon lender 
liability predicated under the theory espoused by the California 
court in Connor v. Great Western Savincs £ Loan, et al.f 447 P.2d 
609 (Cal. 1S68). 
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5. This Court specifically finds that the DeHrys have 
notf and cannot, represent that Valley Mortgage engaged in any 
type of activity or behavior, or conduct that would suggest that 
the standards set forth in the Connor v. Great Western Savincs & 
Loan case should apply in the case before the Court. 
6. The Court further finds that the Connor v. Great 
Western Savincs & Loan case is a California case, and has not 
been adopted by the state of Utah. 
7. If the Connor case standard were applied, however, 
the Court specifically finds that there have been no representa-
tion or pleadings by the DeBrys that demonstrated that Valley 
Mortgage was anything other than a standard lending institution 
in the Cascade building project, and that the pleadings did not 
allege egregious, outrageous or commercially inappropriate 
behavior by Valley Mortgage' in its involvement with the Cascade 
project. 
ORDER 
THEREFORE, based on the findings of the Court, all of 
which are predicated on the allegations set forth in DeBrys1 
Fourth Amended Complaint, arguments by counsel orally and in 
writing, and in the absence of any specific facts cited to the 
Court by DeBrys to support the pleadings, the Court grants Valley 
-4-
Mortgage's Motion to Dismiss all counts and allegations by the 
DeBrys as set forth in their Fourth Amended Complaint. 
ENTERED this 7 day of /vyV'V 1990. 
- * — • - V 
BY THE COURT: 
DI'STRICT COURT ~DTJDGE 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
EDWARD T . WELLS 
Counsel f o r P l a i n t i f f s 
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